

~~SECRET~~

26 JUL 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM:



CIA Representative


25X1

SUBJECT: Update of SECOM Harassments and Provocations Study

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, dated 14 May 1984, same
Subject, file SECOM-D-109

1. Attached are vignettes on incidents of harassments and provocations that took place since the 1982 update of the study on the Subject.

2. Case 1 can be utilized in an unclassified version of the update. The additional material identified as Case 4 is also unclassified and may be included in such an update. Cases 2 and 3 are classified SECRET, and may be used if a SECRET study is published.



25X1

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM SECRET ATTACHMENT

OS 4 1623

~~SECRET~~

CASE 1

Recently, the teenage son of a government employee participated in a student tour of the Soviet Union. Upon the group's arrival at the airport, the other students were processed quickly; however, when this young man's turn came, he was directed to an adjacent room and instructed to open his suitcase. During the search of his belongings, he was questioned about his father's occupation. The young man responded that his father was in the media, a true statement about his father's earlier employment. When queried about an ordinary notebook that was in his possession, he replied that his school assignment was to record his observations about the trip. Of interest is the fact that this young man was the only member of the group subjected to such treatment.

This same young man was later approached at a social gathering in Kiev, by a reporter carrying a tape recorder. The reporter began to interview him and, pleased with his initial remarks, started asking him questions about the placement of military equipments in Europe. When the young man's responses apparently did not meet with his approval, the reporter quickly terminated the interview.

SECRET

CASE 2

In the very recent past, two military attaches, one from a North American country, the other from Western Europe, and both posted to their respective embassies in Moscow, were traveling in the USSR. They stopped in a city and eventually, minus their wives, went for a stroll. They soon arrived near a Soviet military establishment, where they noticed other people walking along what appeared to be a shortcut, which they followed. The attaches were in short order challenged, stopped and escorted to a room where they were questioned. The West European presented his credentials and did not encounter too much trouble; the North American, however, was without his credentials and was put through some questioning. Although the West European vouched for his companion as a fellow military attache, the interrogators paid little heed to either man's protests of their detention. The Soviets were agreeable to letting the West European depart the compound, but he refused to leave his companion. After some time, the Soviets allowed the two to leave for their hotel.

The moral of this story is that official documentation should always be carried and an individual should double check to ensure that his or her documentation is on their person.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

CASE 3

An employee of an organization affiliated with the U.S. Government in Austria vacationed in his native Yugoslavia approximately three years ago. He was introduced to an individual described as the hotel manager's friend. The employee, a naturalized citizen of a Western Hemisphere country, described their meeting as friendly, cordial and covering topics ranging from life in the West to Yugoslavian vacations.

The following year the employee returned to Yugoslavia to visit relatives and friends. One morning, the employee received a telephone call from the person he had met during the previous year's vacation. This individual persisted in trying to arrange a meeting. The employee finally relented, went to the meeting, and was surprised when the individual introduced himself as a member of the security service. The security officer asked the employee whether or not he knew anything about emigre groups. The employee staunchly denied that he did and the inquisitor switched to a discussion of world affairs. Their conversation eventually ended in a friendly vein with the security officer realizing that his attempts were getting him nowhere.

The moral of this story is twofold: First, internal services have the capability to determine where a visitor will be located; second, staunch, unwavering denials that you have knowledge of what they are looking for will turn them off.

SECRET

25X1

CASE 4

It is interesting to note that the USSR requires that permission be granted to photograph factories engaged in civil production, railway stations, airports, river ports, and government buildings. Needless to say, asking for permission to take such photographs will draw attention to the photographer. Photographing military objects, fuel stores and establishments, naval ports, railway junctions, tunnels, bridges, scientific research institutions, laboratories, radio, telephone and telegraphic stations is prohibited, as is taking photographs while flying over the territory of the USSR. Your best bet is to keep your camera packed away to avoid difficulties while flying over the USSR, at a Soviet airport, or in the vicinity of Soviet military or civil facilities.